### Implementing Whole Genome Cluster Analysis to Aid in Salmonella Outbreak Investigations

William Wolfgang Wadsworth Center NYSDOH APHL 06/01/14

### CDC statistics on Foodborne Illness in America

Each year

- 1 in 6 (48 million) get sick.
- 128,000 are hospitalized
- 3,000 die
- For about 60% the cause is unknown.

In 2011.

- Salmonella accounted for 1 million cases.
- 19,000 hospitalizations and 378 deaths.
- Rates of Salmonella infections are increasing.

# Surveillance of Salmonella in New York State

In New York all **positive patient specimens** are submitted to the Wadsworth Bacteriology Laboratory.

Bacteriology receives ~1,800 Salmonella patient specimens each year.

- Serotyped.
- DNA is fingerprinted by PFGE.

All data is sent to the CDC.

PFGE data bases are monitored:

- To detect outbreaks in the patient population.
- To find source of the outbreak.





### For Salmonella Enteritidis PFGE typing methods are poor at resolving clusters



MLVA-PFGE types

### Thus Salmonella Enteritidis outbreaks are rarely detected

#### 2010 Outbreaks

- Montevideo salami.
- Typhimurium long term care facility.
- Javiana tomatoes.
- Saintpaul restaurant.
- Enteritidis long term care facility (4).

#### 2011 Outbreaks

- Typhimurium aquatic frogs.
- Heidelberg ground turkey.
- Enteritidis food worker at a deli (692).
- Typhimurium ground beef.
- Enteritidis -Turkish pine nuts (8).

#### 2012 Outbreaks

- Bareilly sushi.
- Nchanga sushi.
- Hartford sub shop worker.
- Newport chick and duck exposure.
- SanDiego & Poona small turtles.
- Javiana Mothers Day fruit baskets.
- Enteritidis Cargill ground beef (9).

Retrospective studies have shown that WGS can improve pathogen tracking and surveillance.

- MRSA
- Tb
- Drug resistant *Klebsiella pneumoniae*
- Cholera outbreak in Haiti.
- Salmonella Montevideo outbreak from pepper.

#### A Whole-Genome Single Nucleotide Polymorphism-Based Approach To Trace and Identify Outbreaks Linked to a Common Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica Serovar Montevideo Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis Type †

Henk C. den Bakker,<sup>1\*</sup> Andrea I. Moreno Switt,<sup>1</sup> Craig A. Cummings,<sup>2</sup> Karin Hoelzer,<sup>1</sup>
 Lovorka Degoricija,<sup>2</sup> Lorraine D. Rodriguez-Rivera,<sup>1</sup> Emily M. Wright,<sup>1</sup> Rixun Fang,<sup>2</sup>
 Margaret Davis,<sup>3</sup> Tim Root,<sup>4</sup> Dianna Schoonmaker-Bopp,<sup>4</sup> Kimberlee A. Musser,<sup>4</sup>
 Elizabeth Villamil,<sup>4</sup> HaeNa Waechter,<sup>5</sup> Laura Kornstein,<sup>5</sup>
 Manohar R. Furtado,<sup>2</sup> and Martin Wiedmann<sup>1</sup>

#### Identification of a Salmonellosis Outbreak by Means of Molecular Sequencing

E. Kurt Lienau, Ph.D. Errol Strain, Ph.D. Charles Wang, B.S. Jie Zheng, D.V.M., Ph.D. Andrea R. Ottesen, Ph.D. Christine E. Keys, M.S. Thomas S. Hammack, M.S. Steven M. Musser, Ph.D. Eric W. Brown, Ph.D. Marc W. Allard, Ph.D. Food and Drug Administration College Park, MD marc.allard@fda.hhs.gov Guoiie Cao, M.S. Jianghong Meng, D.V.M., Ph.D. University of Maryland College Park, MD Robert Stones, M.S. Food and Environment Research Agency York, United Kingdom

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## Cannoli outbreak

- Sept. 2010 Connecticut Dept. of Health identifies a *Salmonella* outbreak in a long term care facility.
- Outbreak was linked to cannoli from a Westchester bakery.
- Both NY and CT cases consumed cannoli's.
- Isolates had the most common PFGE pattern, JEGX01.0004.







#### Retrospective cohort

Key	County	Date	PFGE-MLVA Combined
IDR1000029153	Cattaraugus	8/10/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000031528	Rockland	8/26/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000033213	Putnam	9/10/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000033369	Putnam	9/10/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000033371	Putnam	9/11/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000034601	Washington	9/13/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000034587	Westchester	9/20/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035417	Putnam	9/22/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035178	Westchester	9/13/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035179	Greenwich CT	9/12/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035180	Westchester	9/12/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035181	Westchester	9/13/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035182	Westchester	9/12/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000035183	Greenwich CT	9/16/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000036119		9/17/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100035184	Westchester	9/16/10	JEGX01.0004AE
IDR1000036319	Putnam	9/28/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000036979	Putnam	10/8/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000038792	Nassau	10/29/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000034599	Orange	9/15/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100006235	Westchester	2/21/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100021079	Rockland	7/13/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000030147	Out-Of-State	8/22/10	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100003844	Onondaga	2/1/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100022186	Yates	7/22/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100027690	Erie	9/6/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100030508	Madison	10/9/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100031312	Suffolk	10/5/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1100032014	Onondaga	10/22/11	JEGX01.0004W
IDR1000028670	Nassau	8/8/10	JEGX01.0004B
IDR1000029949	Suffolk	8/16/10	JEGX01.0004B
IDR1000033603	Erie	9/14/10	JEGX01.0004B
IDR1000034213	Erie	9/13/10	JEGX01.0004B
IDR1000037723	Westchester	10/4/10	JEGX01.0004B
IDR1000039087	Westchester	10/27/10	JEGX01.0004B

# WGCA can identify an outbreak cluster not detected by PFGE



#### Implementing WGCA in real-time.

- Evaluate WGCA efficacy compared to PFGE.
  - Speed
  - Actionable Clusters
  - Cost
- Develop in house bioinformatic pipeline.
- Develop communication pipeline to epidemiologists.
- Determine cluster parameters that represent an outbreak from a single source.
- Acquire a real data set to evaluate evolving informatic methods.

Data is analyzed using a portal developed by Informatics core

#### **Bill's Salmonella Pipelines**

Minnesota Data Pipeline SNP finder and Tree builder for Minnesota Salmonella samples

<u>Pipeline Merger</u> Create Tree and Heatmap from Salmonella merged data

Salmonella Pipeline SNP finder and Tree builder for Salmonella



Galaxy

A

## Pipeline











## In 6 months:

156 isolates have been sequenced and analyzed.

• .ca 6 isolates / week

28 clusters were reported to epidemiologists.

- 1 cluster every week
- 12 clusters have **zero** snp differences.
  - Collected up to 6 months apart.

10 clusters acquired one or more new isolates.

• 7 isolates in the largest cluster

## **Clusters with identical SNPs**

cluster	# of isolates	temporal distance	spatial distance	epidemiologic al report
GC-13	3	2d	metro	family thanksgiving meal
GC-02	2	4d	same county	shopped at same grocery store
GC-27	2	6d	same county	sibs
GC-09	4	42d	2 in one county; 2 distant	husband wife pair; other two not related
GC-07	3	6mo	metro	no common source identified

# PFGE vs. WGCA for surveillance

metric	PFGE	WGCA
TAT from isolation	2 days	7 days
Cost	\$69	\$294
Technician time	8h	10h
Actionable clusters	2	28

## Two State Network

- Collaborating with Minnesota.
  - Currently no informatics in house.
- We pull their sequences of Basespace.
- Run through our pipeline.







### FDA Genome Trackr network

#### State Health labs

- New York
- Florida
- Arizona
- Washington
- Minnesota
- Virginia
- Maryland

#### **FDA labs**

- 9 FDA field labs
- CFSAN MOD1
- CFSAN Wiley
- IEH (contracting lab)



#### International labs

- Mexico
- Ireland
- UK (FERA)
- Columbia

#### Contributors

- Turkey
- Brazil
- Italy

## **Genomic Surveillance Machine**

- State labs feed the machine by uploading sequences from isolates received through surveillance.
- Federal and other support for reagents and equipment.
- NCBI to analyze the products of this machine and reports results to state and federal agencies.









### Expected Outcomes for WGS surveillance

Laboratory

- Improve outbreak cluster detection.
- Clusters will be detected more rapidly and from fewer isolates.

Epidemiologists

- Allow identification of clusters within **endemic** patterns.
- Allow more efficient use of resources by focusing on highly genetically related clusters.
- Solve more clusters.

Public Health

• More efficient identification and removal of pathogen sources.

# Challenges exist in Creating a Network

- Increasing amounts of data.
- Metadata: how much should be public?
  - In real time?
  - What elements?
- Transitioning:
  - Integration with PFGE typing.
  - Integrating surveillance at a national level.
  - Paying.
- As sequencing technology and bioinformatics evolve:
  - Need to maintain backward compatibility

# THE FUTURE

#### Near term

- Universal Salmonella tree
- Hands off data submission to NCBI
- Hands off data analysis

#### **Further out**

- Entire process automated
  - Sample preparation
  - Sequencing
  - Identification of clusters
  - Reporting

## Summary

- WGS can improve surveillance activities and outbreak traceback.
- It is practical to develop network.
- It is likely the transition will be gradual first to go live.
  - Pathogens with more stable genomes.
  - Pathogens with greatest Public Health Impact.